

# UNCLASSIFIED



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-1001



DAMI-CHI (100)

19 Feb 99

MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Policy Guidance for Intelligence Support to Force Protection in CONUS

1. References:

- a. AR 381 -10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities, 1 Aug 84.
- b. AR 381-12, Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA)  
15 Jan 93.
- c. AR 381-20, The Army Counterintelligence Program, 15 Nov 93.
- d. AR 525-13, Antiterrorism Force Protection (AT/FP): Security of Personnel,  
Information, and Critical Resources, 10 Sep 98.
- e. DoD message, ATSD-10, dtg 181700Z Nov 98, subject: Policy Guidance for  
Intelligence Support to Force Protection (enclosed).

2. Reference 1a governs Military Intelligence (MI) activities that affect United States Persons, and states that authority to employ certain collection techniques is limited to that necessary to perform functions assigned to the intelligence component. References 1b-1d assign more specific functions and responsibilities for intelligence support to force protection. Reference 1e is the most current DoD guidance.

3. This memo implements reference 1e and provides additional guidance:

- a. Although reference 1e refers to a DoD list of U.S. Persons and organizations against whom DoD intelligence elements may collect, Army MI elements may not conduct intelligence activities specifically targeting them. Because the Army maintains its law enforcement separately from its intelligence elements, it is inappropriate to collect information on these persons and organizations through intelligence activities. The Army designated law enforcement as the responsible agency, per reference 1d.

- b. MI elements will no longer report U.S. criminal threat information as intelligence or SAEDA incident reports. This change is being included in the revision of references 1b and 1c. Note that this does not pertain to national security crimes (treason, spying, espionage, sedition, subversion, etc.), which are within MI responsibility per reference 1c.

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c. MI personnel will pass, via the most expedient method, U.S. criminal and U.S. terrorist threat information received through normal assigned activities ("incidentally acquired") to the Provost Marshal/Director of Security and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). Receiving and passing the information fully complies with references 1a and 1e. Do not send copies to the HQDA Antiterrorism Operations and Intelligence Cell or Army Counterintelligence Center, as it could create circular reporting or false confirmation. USACIDC has that reporting responsibility, per reference 1d. A synopsis may be filed in general correspondence files ("administrative purposes"), as needed, for crediting work done.

d. MI personnel will refer requests for U.S. terrorist and U.S. criminal threat information and assessments to USACIDC or the Provost Marshal, in accordance with reference 1d. Local threat assessments are the installation's responsibility; MI may augment the local information with foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information and analysis.

e. MI personnel participating in AT/FP assessment teams per reference 1d are responsible for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information and analysis. They may provide analytical advice and assistance to other team personnel in developing the overall assessment, but should not be used as the analytical subject matter expert for non-MI functional areas.

f. Any MI element may request a collectability determination through command channels to HQDA (DAMI-CHI), in accordance with references 1a and 1e. Because of the 90-day retention time limit in reference 1a, commanders must ensure speedy transmittal to HQDA.

4. This memo was coordinated with the Office of the Army General Counsel, Office of The Judge Advocate General, Office of The Inspector General, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, USACIDC, and the Intelligence and Security Command.

5. Ensure widest possible dissemination to commanders, operations personnel, installation security officials, provosts marshal, inspectors general, criminal investigative and intelligence elements. MACOM supplements require HQDA prior approval.

Encl

*Original Signed*  
CLAUDIA J. KENNEDY  
Lieutenant General, GS  
Deputy Chief of Staff  
for Intelligence

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