The success of your security program is based on the principle that security is everyone’s responsibility. While each employee is responsible for the protection of national security information, the security supervision of your workforce remains the responsibility of each supervisor. How enthusiastically you assume your security role, and how effectively you use the available resources will have a significant influence on how well you accomplish this responsibility.

While there is no single formula for ensuring that your employees apply sound security practices. This guide provides some suggestions that may assist you in developing your efforts in the security area.
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Element 1: DESIGNATION OF SENSITIVE AND PUBLIC TRUST POSITIONS

Every DoD position is assigned a sensitivity or public trust designation based on the criterion that best describes the main duties of the job. Position sensitivity and public trust is assigned based on the work that is assigned to the organization and incumbent and focuses on the impact to the DoD mission and national security.

Within the Department of Defense (DoD), each civilian position is categorized with respect to security into one of five groups:

- Special Sensitive (SS)
- Critical Sensitive (CS)
- Non-Critical Sensitive (NCS)
- Non-Sensitive (NS)
- Public Trust (PT)

SS positions involve the following:

- Access to SCI information
- Access to unique or uniquely productive intelligence sources or methods vital to the U.S. security
- Positions that could cause grave damage and/or compromise technologies, plans, or procedures vital to the strategic advantage of the U.S.

Generally, CS positions involve the following:

- Access to TOP SECRET information.
- Duties under special access programs.
- Information Technology.

NCS positions typically involve the following:

- Access to SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL information.
- Information Technology (IT) II duties.

NS positions fall under Human Resources, not Security.

Remember: The sensitivity designation applies to the duties of the position, not to the person occupying the position. A position can be sensitive without requiring access to classified information.

PT Positions:

Positions at the high or moderate risk levels would normally be designated as “Public Trust” positions. Such positions may involve policy making, major program responsibility, public safety and health, law enforcement duties, fiduciary responsibilities, or other duties demanding a significant degree of public trust; and positions involving access to or operation or control of financial records, with a significant risk for causing damage or realizing personal gain.
Element 2: CLEARANCE LEVEL AND ACCESS

This element focuses on access to classified information or material that has been designated as classified by an original classification authority.

There are three levels of classified information:
- TOP SECRET (TS)
- SECRET (S)
- CONFIDENTIAL (C)

Element 3: INVESTIGATIVE REQUIREMENTS

Once an individual has been selected for a position, a background investigation is conducted to collect and evaluate information about the potential incumbent.

Depending on the sensitivity designation of the positions involved, different types of investigations are initiated. Usually, these investigations must be completed and adjudicated prior to assigning individuals to CS or NCS positions.

Depending on the type of investigation and the prospective employee’s personal history, the results of the investigation may delay reporting by several months. In some situations, waivers to the pre-appointment investigative requirements may be possible.

Sources of information for these investigations (and reinvestigations) might include:
- Current and former supervisors
- Co-workers
- Private sources
- Other Government agencies
- Individuals occupying other sensitive positions
- Public media
- Activity records
## DoD Standard Forms and Investigative Requirements

<table>
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<th>Standard Form</th>
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<td>You will use this request format:</td>
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Adjudication is the evaluation of information contained in an investigation or other documents. A judgment concerning security eligibility is made by evaluating the information against the DoD Adjudicative Standards.

Adjudicative determinations for DoD civilian employees are made by the Washington Headquarters Services Consolidated Adjudications Facility (WHS/CAF), National Geospatial Agency (NGA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency (SS positions only). Adjudicative determinations for DoD military members are made by the appropriate military adjudication facility (Army, Navy, or Air Force). Adjudication determinations for DoD contract employees are made by the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO).

Once the initial favorable eligibility determination has been made, an individual falls under the Continuous Evaluation Program (CEP) while “in status” (assigned to a sensitive position or having access to classified information or material). By definition, CEP involves the uninterrupted assessment of an individual for retention of a security clearance or continuing assignment to sensitive duties.

CEP includes reinvestigation at given intervals based on the types of duties performed and level of access to classified information. Incumbents of CS positions are reevaluated every five years. Incumbents of NCS positions are reinvestigated every 10 years if they have access to SECRET material, and every 15 years if the access is to CONFIDENTIAL information.
INVESTIGATION & GUIDELINES
INVESTIGATIVE AND ADJUDICATIVE PROCESSES

DoD personnel may be granted a security clearance or be assigned sensitive duties after a two-step process of investigation and adjudication.

**Step 1:**
INVESTIGATION

Investigation involves the inquiry into the employee’s past to gather information to help determine whether he or she can be trusted with classified information or to perform sensitive duties.

**Investigators may conduct checks in the following areas:**
- Financial
- Criminal
- Residences
- Psychological
- Foreign Travel
- Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
- Education
- Drug
- Alcohol
- References
- Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

**Step 2:**
ADJUDICATION

Adjudication is the decision whether to grant or deny/revoke either a clearance or the eligibility to perform sensitive duties based upon the investigative evidence.

During the adjudication process, adjudicators use a “whole person” concept in determining whether a clearance or eligibility is to be granted. They carefully weigh the information that has been gathered during investigation, favorable and unfavorable, past and present. The employee’s strengths are evaluated to determine whether these strengths outweigh any weaknesses. Each case is judged on its own merit.
A personnel security investigation is an inquiry into an individual’s loyalty, character, trustworthiness, and reliability to ensure that he or she is eligible to access classified information or occupy a position of trust. Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information/eligibility to perform sensitive duties is resolved in favor of the national security.

The **13 Adjudicative Guidelines** for determining eligibility to perform sensitive duties:
- Allegiance to the U.S.
- Foreign influence.
- Foreign preference.
- Sexual behavior.
- Personal conduct.
- Financial considerations.
- Alcohol consumption.
- Drug involvement.
- Psychological conditions.
- Criminal conduct.
- Handling protected information.
- Outside activities.
- Use of information technology systems.

To maintain eligibility, employees must recognize and avoid behaviors that might jeopardize their security clearance or eligibility to perform sensitive duties. Supervisors are well positioned to remind employees of these responsibilities and encourage reporting when an activity or event may put an employee’s clearance in jeopardy.

Early intervention is often the key to quick, effective resolution of problems without harming the employee or the organization. Information on how to help employees with personal problems can be found on the “Referral” tab.

The 13 Adjudicative Guidelines are also used in evaluating the impact of a potentially derogatory event.

**In addition, the Adjudication Facility may take into account other factors:**
- The nature, extent, and seriousness of the circumstances.
- The fact that reporting was voluntary.
- Truthfulness and completeness in responding to questions.
- The fact that the employee sought help and followed professional guidance.
- Whether positive changes in behavior were demonstrated.
The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about allegiance to the U.S.:

- Involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against the U.S.
- Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts.
- Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort or do one of the following:
  - Overthrow or influence the Government of the U.S. or any state or local Government;
  - Prevent Federal, State, or local Government personnel from performing their official duties;
  - Gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal, State, or local Government; or
  - Prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the U.S. or of any state.

The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about foreign influence:

- Contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or the person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contract creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.
- Connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information.
- Counterintelligence information, that may be classified, indicates that the individual’s access to protected information may involve unacceptable risk to national security.
- Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relation creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion.

The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about foreign preference:

- Exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member.
- Action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an American citizen.
- Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or government in conflict with the national security interest.
- Any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than the U.S. (e.g., renunciation of U.S. citizenship).
Condition 4: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR

The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about sexual behavior:

- Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted.
- A pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high risk sexual behavior that the person is unable to stop or that may be symptomatic of a personality disorder.
- Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress.
- Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack of discretion or judgment.

Condition 5: PERSONAL CONDUCT

The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about personal conduct:

- Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities.
- Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official Government representative.
- Credible adverse information in several adjudicating issue areas that are not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guidelines, but which, when assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected information.
- Credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available information, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected information.
Condition 6: FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about financial considerations:

- Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts.
- Indebtedness caused by frivolous or irresponsible spending and the absence of any evidence of willingness or intent to pay the debt or establish a realistic plan to pay the debt.
- A history of not meeting financial obligations.
- Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust.
- Consistent spending beyond one’s means, which may be indicated by excessive indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, high debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial analysis.
- Financial problems that are linked to drug abuse, alcoholism, gambling problems, or other issues of security concern.
- Failure to file annual Federal, state, or local income tax returns as required or the fraudulent filing of the same.
- Compulsive or addictive gambling as indicated by an unsuccessful attempt to stop gambling, “chasing losses”, concealment of gambling losses, borrowing money to fund gambling or pay gambling debts, family conflict or other problems caused by gambling.
- Unexplained affluence, as shown by a lifestyle or standard of living, increase in net worth, or money transfers that cannot be explained by the individual’s known legal source of income.

Condition 7: ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION

The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about alcohol consumption:

- Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or other incidents of concern regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent.
- Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol dependent.
- Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent.
- Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence.
- Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
- Failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol education, evaluation, treatment, or abstinence.
The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about drug involvement:

- Any drug abuse, (i.e., illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.)
- Testing positive for illegal drug use.
- Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia.
- Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence.
- Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program.
- Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a duly qualified medical professional.
- Any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance.
- Expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue drug use.

The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about psychological conditions:

- Behavior that casts doubt on an individual’s judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness that is not covered under any other guideline, including but not limited to emotionally unstable, irresponsible, dysfunctional, violent, paranoid or bizarre behavior.
- An opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that the individual has a condition not covered under any other guidelines that may impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness.
- Failure to follow treatment advice related to a diagnosed emotional, mental or personality condition (e.g., failure to take prescribed medicine).

The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about criminal conduct:

- A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
- Discharge or dismissal from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions.
- Allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted, or convicted.
- Currently being on parole or probation.
- Violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a court-mandated rehabilitation program.
The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about handling protected information:

- Deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified or other protected information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to personal or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present at seminars, meetings, or conferences.
- Collecting or storing classified or other protected information at home or in any other unauthorized location.
- Loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or otherwise handling classified reports, data, or other information on any unapproved equipment including but not limited to any typewriter, word processor, or computer hardware, software, drive, system, game board, handheld, “palm” or pocket device or other adjunct equipment.
- Inappropriate efforts to obtain or view classified or other protected information outside one’s need to know.
- Copying classified or other protected information in a manner designed to conceal or remove classification or other document control markings.
- Viewing or downloading information from a secure system when the information is beyond the need-to-know.
- Failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other sensitive information.
- Failure to comply with rules or regulations that result in a damage to the National Security.

The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about outside activities:

- Any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer, with:
  - the government of a foreign country;
  - any foreign national, organization, or other entity;
  - a representative of any foreign interest, or;
  - any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
- Failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when required.
Condition 13:
USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS

The following are examples of conditions that may raise concerns about misuse of information technology systems:

- Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system or component thereof.
- Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation or denial of access to information, software, firmware, or hardware in an information technology system.
- Use of any information technology system to gain unauthorized access to another system or to a compartmented area within the same system.
- Downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information on or to any unauthorized software, hardware, or information technology system.
- Unauthorized use of a government or other information technology system.
- Introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware, software, or media to or from any information technology system without authorization, when prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations.
- Negligence or lax security habits in handling information technology that persist despite counseling by management.
- Any misuse of information, whether deliberate or negligent, that result in damage to the national security.
SELF-REPORTING

Self-reporting is an essential component in maintaining the integrity of the Personnel Security Program. Although an employee may obtain a clearance or may be assigned to a position of trust, the initial adjudicative decision can be overturned at a later date if the employee concealed relevant information during the investigation or after the clearance was issued.

Employees who occupy positions of trust or have access to classified information are expected to self-report changes or incidents that may impact their clearances. Once again, the 13 Adjudicative Guidelines are a valuable tool in determining if a life-event or situation might result in a need to self-report. Self-reporting, while mandatory, is also a question of personal integrity and certainly preferable to the incident or change being discovered.

Listed below are some incidents and life events where self-reporting is expected or may be appropriate.

CHANGE IN PERSONAL STATUS

Self-reporting may be appropriate for the following types of changes:

- Marital status (e.g., marriage, divorce).
- Cohabitation (e.g., living in spouse-like relationship, intimate relationship, engaged).
- Change of name.

FOREIGN TRAVEL

Self-reporting is appropriate for foreign travel because foreign travel requires the following:

- A security briefing prior to any foreign travel, whether for personal or business reasons.
- Clearance for travel to hazardous countries for Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) cleared individuals.

FOREIGN CONTACTS

Self-reporting is appropriate for the following:

- Contact with individuals of any foreign nationality, either within or outside the scope of your official duties, in which illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information.
- Personal concern that you are a target of an attempted exploitation.
- All close and continuing relations between SCI cleared individuals and foreign nationals.
Loss or Compromise of Information

Self-reporting is expected for an inadvertent or accidental loss or compromise of classified or sensitive information because the first priority in such a situation is to regain control of the classified material.

Financial Problems

Self-reporting is appropriate for the following:
- Filing for bankruptcy.
- Garnishment of wages.
- Having a lien placed on your property for failing to pay a creditor.
- Eviction from a residence for failure to pay rent.

Arrests

Self-reporting is appropriate for the following:
- Any arrest, regardless of whether or not charges were filed.
- Other involvement with the legal system (e.g., being sued).
- Any circumstance where there may be a requirement to discuss job or duties under oath.

Psychological Counseling

Self-reporting is appropriate for psychological treatment unless it is for marital, family, or grief counseling, or if counseling was strictly related to adjustments from service in a military combat environment. Seeking help for life’s stressors does not reflect adversely on an individual’s judgment. Instead, it may be viewed as a positive sign that an individual recognizes that a problem exists and is willing to take responsible steps toward resolving it.
DoD leaders, supervisors, and managers, have the following responsibilities:

- Designate civilian positions with appropriate position sensitivity and regularly review those designations to ensure the degree of sensitivity and number of sensitive positions are held to a minimum, consistent with the efficient conduct of business.
- Review the number and level of clearances required to encourage the minimum, consistent with a strict determination of “need-to-know” in the performance of individual employees’ official duties.
- Ensure that, when hiring or assigning new duties, the required clearance eligibility is requested in a timely fashion.
- Approve requirements for access to classified information to only those employees who hold the appropriate clearances, ensuring that they are appropriately briefed and debriefed.
- Report to the appropriate Security Office, through the security representative, when an individual no longer requires a clearance (without prejudice) or when an individual’s clearance or eligibility to occupy a sensitive position is to be temporarily suspended due to information which raises doubt about the wisdom of continued security eligibility.
- Maintain an environment where security is known to be important and compliance is expected and required.
- Be aware of situations that may impact the individual’s clearance eligibility or eligibility to perform sensitive duties.
- Provide ongoing training for employees in the proper handling of classified or sensitive material.

Problems in the workplace can often be prevented by timely and appropriate response to warning signs that an individual is under stress or having trouble handling personal problems.
Supervisors are responsible for identifying problems at an early stage, so that any assistance will have a reasonable chance of preventing long-term performance or security problems.

Supervisors should not become personally involved in an employee’s personal problems. They should, however, ensure that a troubled employee who needs help is referred to the professionals who are trained to give it.

The first step in dealing with any performance problem is normal supervisory counseling. If this does not solve the problem, consider referring the employee to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The EAP staff is trained to assess whether or not an employee’s performance deficiencies are rooted in some personal problem and, if so, to help the employee deal with these difficulties.

The employee should be advised that referral to the EAP is not an adverse administrative action. It is, rather, a means of trying to avoid an adverse administrative action. The employee has the right to refuse EAP assistance. Whether EAP assistance is accepted or refused, the employee remains responsible for improving work performance to acceptable levels.
### SECURITY CONCERNS

Supervisors often have unnecessary concerns about referring an employee to the EAP. They are often afraid of hurting an employee, even though an EAP referral may be the only chance an employee has of getting the help they need. Supervisors should focus on the harm caused by not referring a troubled employee to the professionals who are trained to help.

Supervisors may feel that referring a problem, rather than solving it themselves, means they are not doing their job. But it is not the supervisor’s job to diagnose the employee’s personal problem or to solve it. Part of the supervisor’s job is knowing organizational resources and exercising good judgment about how and when to use them.

#### STRESS

Too much stress or chronic stress can lead to poor judgment. No employee ever exploded in violence or committed suicide because they were happy and relaxed. They were “stressed out” and desperate.

A safe and secure office environment is one in which employees know how to recognize and manage the negative aspects of stress.

#### ALCOHOL PROBLEMS

**Alcohol abuse or dependence is a security concern when:**

- It affects an individual’s ability to exercise the care, judgment and discretion necessary to protect classified information or perform sensitive duties.
- It is part of a pattern of impulsive, immature, sensation-seeking, hostile, or antisocial behavior.

An alcohol problem is more serious when it is part of a broader pattern of undesirable behavior. It may indicate an underlying psychological disorder that will cause future problems and resist treatment.

How the person behaves under the influence of alcohol is more important than how much or how often subject drinks, and even whether or not the subject is formally diagnosed as an alcoholic.

#### EATING DISORDERS

Severe eating disorders are primarily a medical problem, but anorexia and bulimia do have security overtones. Both are frequently accompanied by other mood, anxiety and personality disorders that may be a security concern.

Those who suffer from bulimia are typically ashamed of their eating problems and attempt to conceal them. Their binge eating usually occurs in secrecy.

Any out-of-control behavior that a person is ashamed of and seeks to conceal is a potential vulnerability of security concern.
DEPRESSION: USUALLY NOT A SECURITY ISSUE IF APPROPRIATELY TREATED

As a general rule, depression alone is treated as a medical or performance problem, not a security issue. It is not the type of illness that is likely to trigger impulsive or high-risk behavior.

- The depressed person generally lacks the energy and confidence to embark on new initiatives, especially a high-risk activity such as espionage.
- Depressed individuals are more likely to do nothing, for fear that whatever they do will be wrong and cause even more problems.

Depression could become a security issue if:

- The individual fails to take prescribed medication.
- The depression affects judgment or is accompanied by other problems that cause insecure, unsafe, irresponsible or unreliable behavior.

Depression is sometimes accompanied by periods of mania, in which case it is a different illness altogether. Mania, or extreme excitability or irritability, may cause impulsiveness, poor judgment, and increased talkativeness, all of which are security concerns.

SEXUAL ADDICTION

Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior is a security concern because it may lead to poor judgment or lack of discretion, indicate a serious emotional or mental problem, or attract the attention of hostile intelligence or security services and open one to exploitation, manipulation, or coercion.

DRUG USE

Drug use or abuse raises a number of specific security concerns:

- Use of an illegal drug indicates an unwillingness or inability to abide by the law.
- Users of illegal drugs may be susceptible to blackmail, especially if exposure of drug use could cost them their job.
- Procurement of illegal drugs while traveling abroad or carrying drugs across national boundaries risks attracting the attention of foreign intelligence services or other individuals who may seek to exploit this vulnerability.
- The more dangerous the drug, the more the drug use indicates a propensity for irresponsible or high risk behavior, rebellion against social norms, alienation, or emotional maladjustment, all of which may be security concerns. These characteristics cast doubt upon an individual’s judgment and ability to protect classified information or perform sensitive duties even when not under the influence of drugs.
- Drug abuse or dependence often indicates the presence of broad emotional or personality problems of security concern. It may also cause financial problems, leading to criminal activity to financial drug habit.
An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of engaging in illegal acts to generate funds.

- If a person is not at fault for the financial problems and is dealing with in a reasonable manner, security concern is substantially alleviated.
- Debts caused by irresponsible or impulsive behavior or by gambling, alcohol abuse or drug abuse are a serious concern. A person who is irresponsible in fulfilling financial obligations may be irresponsible in fulfilling other obligations, such as following the rules for protecting classified information or performing sensitive duties.

Gambling debts may:

- Compromise one’s financial stability.
- Cause problems with family and work.
- Prompt some individuals to engage in illegal activities, including espionage, as a means of covering their losses.

Addicts of all types typically organize a part of their life and their circle of friends around their addiction. Foreign intelligence and security services generally maintain sources in these circles, and it is easy for them to place an agent in contact with a potential target who attracts attention through these activities.

Habitual behaviors that provide such access opportunities for foreign intelligence and security services increase the risk that an individual will become a target and that any vulnerability that does exist will be discovered and exploited.