MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Incident Reporting Requirements and Procedures

1. References:
   c. Commander’s Guide to Incident Reporting (Enclosure 2).

2. Applicability: This memorandum applies to Commanders, Agency Heads, Leaders, and Supervisors of individuals granted a security clearance.

3. Background: Recent incidents regarding workplace violence and compromise of classified information reveal a persistent systemic problem with the lack of reporting adverse information to the Department of Defense Consolidated Adjudication Facility (DoD CAF). Reporting this information is critical in preserving National security and may result in opportunities to prevent unfortunate outcomes.

4. Requirement: All Commanders and supervisors who manage individuals with a security clearance are responsible to ensure the timely reporting of information that brings into question an individual’s judgment, trustworthiness, and reliability to protect classified information. Reportable information includes, but is not limited to, information that indicates financial difficulty, psychological distress, evidence of alcohol abuse, use of illegal or controlled substance(s), and/or illegal or criminal activity. This requirement applies to all individuals with a security clearance regardless of their access to classified information.

5. Procedures: The DA Form 5248-R (Enclosure 3), Report of Unfavorable Information for Security Determination, will be used as the basis to record facts, circumstances, and provide a recommendation regarding the individual’s security clearance and access to classified information. The information will be referred to the DoD CAF via the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (DoD system of record for security clearances).
DAMI-CDS
SUBJECT: Incident Reporting Requirements and Procedures

6. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 point of contact is Ms. Andrea Upperman, andrea.upperman.civ@mail.mil, (703) 695-3053.

3 Encls

MARY A. LEGERE
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2

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SUPERINTENDENT, UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY ACQUISITION SUPPORT CENTER
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information and other Purposes

1. References:

2. Purpose: Re-affirm applicability of National Adjudicative Standards for determining eligibility for access to classified information and other purposes.

3. The adjudicative guidelines in Appendix I, of AR 380-67 are obsolete (Reference 1.a). The Army G-2 is processing a rapid action revision to AR 380-67 to replace the outdated adjudicative guidelines. In the interim, the enclosed adjudicative guidelines will be used by the Army Personnel Security Appeals Board, individuals authorized to grant interim security clearances, as a guide for reporting credible adverse information to the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility, to support decisions on accessing individuals into Special Access Program, or other determinations consist with the provisions of AR 380-67.

4. The Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 point of contact is Andrea Uperman, (703) 695-3053, email: Andrea.Uperman.civ@mail.mil.

Encl

MARY A. LEGERE
Lieutenant General, GS
Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2
DAMI-CD

SUBJECT: Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility For Access to Classified Information

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SUPERINTENDENT, UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY ACQUISITION SUPPORT CENTER
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Implementation of Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility For Access to Classified Information

1. References:

2. The enclosed Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence memo dated 30 August 2006 directs the implementation of the revised Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility For Access to Classified Information within DoD effective 1 September 2006. The revised Adjudicative Guidelines have been modified for use within DoD and incorporate the provisions of the "Smith Amendment," Section 986 of Title 10 of the United States Code, as amended.

3. The revised Adjudicative Guidelines apply to all adjudications and other determinations made under the provision of DoD 5200.2-R and Army Regulation 380-67, Personnel Security Program. They replace the present guidelines published in reference a. and Appendix Eight to reference b. Adjudicative determinations which contain a Statement of Reasons (SOR) dated on or after 1 September 2006 will be decided under the new adjudicative guidelines. All adjudications or other determinations with a SOR dated prior to 1 September 2006 will be made under the old guidelines until a final eligibility determination has been rendered.

4. The HQDA, DCS, G-2 points of contact for this matter are Teresa Nankivel, DSN 225-9605 or commercial 703-695-9605, teresa.nankivel@us.army.mil or Julia Swan, DSN 225-2629 or commercial 703-695-2629, lulla.swan@us.army.mil.

THOMAS A. GANDY
Director, Counterintelligence, Human Intelligence, Disclosure & Security Directorate

Enclosure
DAMI-CD
SUBJECT: Implementation of Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility For Access to Classified Information

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Deputy Chief of Staff, G1
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U.S. Army Military Academy (USMA)
U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC)
U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center
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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT
DIRECTORS OF THE DEFENSE AGENCIES
DIRECTORS OF THE DOD FIELD ACTIVITIES

Subject: Implementation of Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility
For Access to Classified Information (December 29, 2005)

This memorandum directs the implementation of the attached revised
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified
Information (December 29, 2005), as modified, effective September 1, 2006.

The revised Guidelines supersede the memorandum issued by the former
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence dated August 16, 2000, Subject: Guidance to DoD Central
Adjudication Facilities (CAF) Clarifying the Application of the Foreign Preference
Adjudicative Guideline.

The attachment incorporates the provisions of the “Smith Amendment,”
Section 986 of Title 10 of the United States Code, as amended. The Smith
Amendment provides authority to grant an exception to the prohibition concerning
persons convicted of a crime, sentenced to a term exceeding one year, and
incarcerated for not less than one year, or who have been discharged or dismissed
from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions. An exception to the Smith
Amendment for the persons described above is only authorized by a designated
waiver authority in meritorious cases where mitigating factors exist that are
consistent with the mitigating factors described in the attached Adjudicative
Guidelines.
The waiver authority formerly held by the Secretary of Defense is now delegated to the Director, Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) or designee, for its employees and those entities serviced by WHS; the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) or designee, for its employees and those entities serviced by DIA; the Director, National Security Agency (NSA) or designee, for its employees and those entities serviced by NSA; the Director, Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) or designee, for an officer or employee of a DoD contractor serviced by DOHA; and the Secretaries of the Military Departments or designee. Waiver authority may not be further delegated to a member of the Component Personnel Security Appeal Board or the DOHA Security Clearance Appeal Board.

The revised Guidelines apply to all adjudications and other determinations made under the Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5220.6, January 2, 1992, Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program, and the DoD Personnel Security Program, DoD 5200.2-R, January 1, 1987. They replace the present guidelines published in Enclosure Two to DoDD 5220.6 and Appendix Eight to DoD 5200.2-R. Military Department and Defense Agency regulations should be revised in accordance with this memorandum.

The revised Guidelines apply to all adjudications and other determinations in which a Statement of Reasons has not been issued by September 1, 2006. All adjudications and other determinations in which a Statement of Reasons has been issued prior to September 1, 2006 will be made under the current Guidelines.

Attachment:
As stated
Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining Eligibility
For Access to Classified Information

1. Introduction. The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all U.S. government civilian and military personnel, consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees, and other individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information and special access programs, and are to be used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations. Government departments and agencies may also choose to apply these guidelines to analogous situations regarding persons being considered for access to other types of protected information.

Decisions regarding eligibility for access to classified information take into account factors that could cause a conflict of interest and place a person in the position of having to choose between his or her commitments to the United States, including the commitment to protect classified information, and any other compelling loyalty. Access decisions also take into account a person's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. No coercive policing could replace the self-discipline and integrity of the person entrusted with the nation's secrets as the most effective means of protecting them. When a person's life history shows evidence of unreliability or untrustworthiness, questions arise whether the person can be relied on and trusted to exercise the responsibility necessary for working in a secure environment where protecting classified information is paramount.

2. The Adjudicative Process.

(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the person is an acceptable security risk. Eligibility for access to classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these personnel security guidelines. The adjudication process is the careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole-person concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:

(1) the nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include knowledgeable participation;

(3) the frequency and recency of the conduct;

(4) the individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;

(5) the extent to which participation is voluntary;

(6) the presence or absence of rehabilitation and other permanent behavioral changes;

(7) the motivation for the conduct;

(8) the potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress; and

(9) the likelihood of continuation or recurrence;

(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or agency. Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the national security.

(c) The ability to develop specific thresholds for action under these guidelines is limited by the nature and complexity of human behavior. The ultimate determination of whether the granting or continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall common sense judgment based upon careful consideration of the following guidelines, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole person.

(1) GUIDELINE A: Allegiance to the United States;

(2) GUIDELINE B: Foreign Influence

(3) GUIDELINE C: Foreign Preference;

(4) GUIDELINE D: Sexual Behavior;

(5) GUIDELINE E: Personal Conduct;

(6) GUIDELINE F: Financial Considerations;

(7) GUIDELINE G: Alcohol Consumption;

(8) GUIDELINE H: Drug Involvement;

(9) GUIDELINE I: Psychological Conditions;

(10) GUIDELINE J: Criminal Conduct;

(11) GUIDELINE K: Handling Protected Information;
(12) GUIDELINE L: Outside Activities;
(13) GUIDELINE M: Use of Information Technology Systems

(d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior. Notwithstanding the whole-person concept, pursuit of further investigation may be terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information.

(e) When information of security concern becomes known about an individual who is currently eligible for access to classified information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:

(1) voluntarily reported the information;
(2) was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
(3) sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate;
(4) resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern;
(5) has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
(6) should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.

(f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.
GUIDELINE A: ALLEGIANCE TO THE UNITED STATES

3. The Concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an individual's allegiance to the United States.

4. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
   (a) involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition against the United States of America;
   (b) association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
   (c) association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to:
      (1) overthrow or influence the government of the United States or any state or local government;
      (2) prevent Federal, state, or local government personnel from performing their official duties;
      (3) gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal, state, or local government;
      (4) prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.

5. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
   (a) the individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
   (b) the individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
   (c) involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
   (d) the involvement or association with such activities occurred under such unusual circumstances, or so much time has elapsed, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or loyalty.
GUIDELINE B: FOREIGN INFLUENCE

6. The Concern. Foreign contacts and interests may be a security concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider the identity of the foreign country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as whether the foreign country is known to target United States citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a risk of terrorism.

7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
   (a) contact with a foreign family member, business or professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
   (b) connections to a foreign person, group, government, or country that create a potential conflict of interest between the individual’s obligation to protect sensitive information or technology and the individual’s desire to help a foreign person, group, or country by providing that information;
   (c) counterintelligence information, that may be classified, indicates that the individual’s access to protected information may involve unacceptable risk to national security;
   (d) sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
   (e) a substantial business, financial, or property interest in a foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of foreign influence or exploitation;
   (f) failure to report, when required, association with a foreign national;
   (g) unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, associate, or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
   (h) indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
(i) conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country.

8. **Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:**

(a) the nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the country in which these persons are located, or the positions or activities of those persons in that country are such that it is unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;

(b) there is no conflict of interest, either because the individual’s sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of interest in favor of the U.S. interest;

(c) contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;

(d) the foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government business or are approved by the cognizant security authority;

(e) the individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign country;

(f) the value or routine nature of the foreign business, financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, manipulate, or pressure the individual.
GUIDELINE C: FOREIGN PREFERENCE

9. *The Concern.* When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions that are harmful to the interests of the United States.

10. *Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:*

   (a) exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign citizenship of a family member. This includes but is not limited to:
   
   (1) possession of a current foreign passport;
   
   (2) military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;
   
   (3) accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, or other such benefits from a foreign country;
   
   (4) residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
   
   (5) using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;
   
   (6) seeking or holding political office in a foreign country;
   
   (7) voting in a foreign election;

   (b) action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign citizenship by an American citizen;

   (c) performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, organization, or government in conflict with the national security interest;

   (d) any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country other than the United States: for example, declaration of intent to renounce United States citizenship; renunciation of United States citizenship.

11. *Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:*

   (a) dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country;

   (b) the individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship;
(c) exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of foreign citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. citizen or when the individual was a minor;

(d) use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant security authority.

(e) the passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated;

(f) the vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United States Government.
GUIDELINE D: SEXUAL BEHAVIOR

12. The Concern. Sexual behavior that involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional disorder, reflects lack of judgment or discretion, or which may subject the individual to undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or duress can raise questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. No adverse inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of the sexual orientation of the individual.

13. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
   (a) sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;
   (b) a pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high risk sexual behavior that the person is unable to stop or that may be symptomatic of a personality disorder;
   (c) sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
   (d) sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack of discretion or judgment.

14. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
   (a) the behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
   (b) the sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
   (c) the behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress.
   (d) the sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and discreet.
15. The Concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid answers during the security clearance process or any other failure to cooperate with the security clearance process.

The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:

(a) refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or cooperate with security processing, including but not limited to meeting with a security investigator for subject interview, completing security forms or releases, and cooperation with medical or psychological evaluation;

(b) refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of investigators, security officials, or other official representatives in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.

16. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts from any personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary responsibilities;

(b) deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official government representative;

(c) credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected information;

(d) credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an adverse determination, but
which, when combined with all available information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected information. This includes but is not limited to consideration of:

(1) untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other government protected information;

(2) disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the workplace;

(3) a pattern of dishonesty or rule violations;

(4) evidence of significant misuse of Government or other employer’s time or resources;

(e) personal conduct, or concealment of information about one's conduct, that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress, such as (1) engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the person’s personal, professional, or community standing, or (2) while in another country, engaging in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is legal in that country but illegal in the United States and may serve as a basis for exploitation or pressure by the foreign security or intelligence service or other group;

(f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the individual to the employer as a condition of employment;

(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity.

17. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) the individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted with the facts;

(b) the refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel or legal counsel advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning the security clearance process. Upon being made aware of the requirement to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated fully and truthfully.

(c) the offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(d) the individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such behavior is unlikely to recur;

(e) the individual has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress;

(f) the information was unsubstantiated or from a source of questionable reliability;

(g) association with persons involved in criminal activity has ceased or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness to comply with rules and regulations.
GUIDELINE F: FINANCIAL CONSIDERATIONS

18. *The Concern.* Failure or inability to live within one’s means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an individual’s reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds. Compulsive gambling is a concern as it may lead to financial crimes including espionage. Affluence that cannot be explained by known sources of income is also a security concern. It may indicate proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.

19. *Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:*

(a) inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;

(b) indebtedness caused by frivolous or irresponsible spending and the absence of any evidence of willingness or intent to pay the debt or establish a realistic plan to pay the debt.

(c) a history of not meeting financial obligations;

(d) deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust;

(e) consistent spending beyond one’s means, which may be indicated by excessive indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, high debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial analysis;

(f) financial problems that are linked to drug abuse, alcoholism, gambling problems, or other issues of security concern;

(g) failure to file annual Federal, state, or local income tax returns as required or the fraudulent filing of the same;

(h) unexplained affluence, as shown by a lifestyle or standard of living, increase in net worth, or money transfers that cannot be explained by subject's known legal sources of income;

(i) compulsive or addictive gambling as indicated by an unsuccessful attempt to stop gambling, “chasing losses” (i.e. increasing the bets or returning another day in an effort to get even), concealment of gambling losses, borrowing money to
fund gambling or pay gambling debts, family conflict or other problems caused by gambling.

20. **Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:**

(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;

(b) the conditions that resulted in the financial problem were largely beyond the person’s control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the circumstances;

(c) the person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control;

(d) the individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts;

(e) the individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue;

(f) the affluence resulted from a legal source of income.
GUIDELINE G: ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION

21. *The Concern.* Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure to control impulses, and can raise questions about an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness.

22. *Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:*

   (a) alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, disturbing the peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;

   (b) alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;

   (c) habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;

   (d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;

   (e) evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;

   (f) relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program;

   (g) failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol education, evaluation, treatment, or abstinence.

23. *Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:*

   (a) so much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;

   (b) the individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser);
(c) the individual is a current employee who is participating in a counseling or treatment program, has no history of previous treatment and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress;

(d) the individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare, has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar organization and has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
GUIDELINE H: DRUG INVOLVEMENT

24. The Concern. Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a prescription drug can raise questions about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may impair judgment and because it raises questions about a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.

(a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and include:

(1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and hallucinogens), and

(2) inhalants and other similar substances;

(b) drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.

25. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) any drug abuse (see above definition);¹

(b) testing positive for illegal drug use;

(c) illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug paraphernalia;

(d) diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence;

(e) evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program;

(f) failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a duly qualified medical professional;

(g) any illegal drug use after being granted a security clearance;

(h) expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue drug use.

26. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

¹ Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 986 any person who is an unlawful user of, or is addicted to, a controlled substance as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802), may not be granted or have renewed their access to classified information.
(a) the behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual’s current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;

(b) a demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as:

   (1) disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;

   (2) changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used;

   (3) an appropriate period of abstinence;

   (4) a signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of clearance for any violation;

(c) abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged illness during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has since ended;

(d) satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including but not limited to rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional.
GUIDELINE I: PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS

27. The Concern. Certain emotional, mental, and personality conditions can impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness. A formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there to be a concern under this guideline. A duly qualified mental health professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist) employed by, or acceptable to and approved by the U.S. Government, should be consulted when evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating information under this guideline. No negative inference concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of seeking mental health counseling.

28. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

   (a) behavior that casts doubt on an individual's judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness that is not covered under any other guideline, including but not limited to emotionally unstable, irresponsible, dysfunctional, violent, paranoid, or bizarre behavior;

   (b) an opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional that the individual has a condition not covered under any other guideline that may impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness;¹

   (c) the individual has failed to follow treatment advice related to a diagnosed emotional, mental, or personality condition, e.g., failure to take prescribed medication.

29. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

   (a) the identified condition is readily controllable with treatment, and the individual has demonstrated ongoing and consistent compliance with the treatment plan;

   (b) the individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or treatment program for a condition that is amenable to treatment, and the individual is currently receiving counseling or treatment with a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified mental health professional;

   (c) recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional employed by, or acceptable to and approved by the U.S. Government that an individual's

¹ Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 986, and person who is mentally incompetent, as determined by a credentialed mental health professional approved by the Department of Defense, may not be granted or have renewed their access to classified information.
previous condition is under control or in remission, and has a low probability of recurrence or exacerbation;

(d) the past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has been resolved, and the individual no longer shows indications of emotional instability;

(e) there is no indication of a current problem.
GUIDELINE J: CRIMINAL CONDUCT

30. *The Concern.* Criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules and regulations.

31. **Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:**

   (a) a single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses;
   (b) discharge or dismissal from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions;
   (c) allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or convicted;
   (d) individual is currently on parole or probation;
   (e) violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a court-mandated rehabilitation program;
   (f) conviction in a Federal or State court, including a court-martial of a crime, sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and incarcerated as a result of that sentence for not less than a year.

32. **Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:**

   (a) so much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual’s reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
   (b) the person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in the person’s life;
   (c) evidence that the person did not commit the offense;

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1 Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 986, a person who has received a dishonorable discharge or has been dismissed from the Armed Forces may not be granted or have renewed access to classified information. In a meritorious case, the Secretaries of the Military Departments or designee, or the Directors of WHS, DIA, NSA, DOHA or designee may authorize a waiver of this prohibition. Waiver authority may not be further delegated to a member of the Component Personnel Security Appeal Board or the DOHA Security Clearance Appeal Board.

2 Under the above mentioned statute, a person who has been convicted in a Federal or State court, including courts martial, sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and incarcerated for not less than one year, may not be granted or have renewed access to classified information. The same waiver provision also applies.
(d) there is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including but not limited to the passage of time without recurrence of criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job training or higher education, good employment record, or constructive community involvement;

(e) potentially disqualifying conditions (b) and (f) above, may not be mitigated unless, where meritorious circumstances exist, the Secretaries of the Military Departments or designee; or the Directors of Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) or designee, has granted a waiver.
GUIDELINE K: HANDLING PROTECTED INFORMATION

33. The Concern. Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with rules and regulations for protecting classified or other sensitive information raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such information, and is a serious security concern.

34. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:

(a) deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified or other protected information to unauthorized persons, including but not limited to personal or business contacts, to the media, or to persons present at seminars, meetings, or conferences;

(b) collecting or storing classified or other protected information at home or in any other unauthorized location;

(c) loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, transmitting, or otherwise handling classified reports, data, or other information on any unapproved equipment including but not limited to any typewriter, word processor, or computer hardware, software, drive, system, gameboard, handheld, “palm” or pocket device or other adjunct equipment;

(d) inappropriate efforts to obtain or view classified or other protected information outside one's need to know;

(e) copying classified or other protected information in a manner designed to conceal or remove classification or other document control markings;

(f) viewing or downloading information from a secure system when the information is beyond the individual's need-to-know;

(g) any failure to comply with rules for the protection of classified or other sensitive information;

(h) negligence or lax security habits that persist despite counseling by management.

(i) failure to comply with rules or regulations that results in damage to the National Security, regardless of whether it was deliberate or negligent.

35. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:

(a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and
does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, trustworthiness, or
good judgment;

(b) the individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial security
training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward the discharge of
security responsibilities;

(c) the security violations were due to improper or inadequate training.
GUIDELINE I: OUTSIDE ACTIVITIES

36. *The Concern.* Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict of interest with an individual's security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

37. *Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:*

   (a) any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer, with:

      (1) the government of a foreign country;

      (2) any foreign national, organization, or other entity;

      (3) a representative of any foreign interest;

      (4) any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology;

   (b) failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when this is required.

38. *Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:*

   (a) evaluation of the outside employment or activity by the appropriate security or counterintelligence office indicates that it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities or with the national security interests of the United States;

   (b) the individual terminated the employment or discontinued the activity upon being notified that it was in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.
GUIDELINE M: USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS

39. *The Concern*. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question the willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include all related computer hardware, software, firmware, and data used for the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, or protection of information.

40. *Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:*

   (a) illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system or component thereof;

   (b) illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation or denial of access to information, software, firmware, or hardware in an information technology system;

   (c) use of any information technology system to gain unauthorized access to another system or to a compartmented area within the same system;

   (d) downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information on or to any unauthorized software, hardware, or information technology system;

   (e) unauthorized use of a government or other information technology system;

   (f) introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware, software, or media to or from any information technology system without authorization, when prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;

   (g) negligence or lax security habits in handling information technology that persist despite counseling by management;

   (h) any misuse of information technology, whether deliberate or negligent, that results in damage to the national security.

41. *Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:*

   (a) so much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
(b) the misuse was minor and done only in the interest of organizational efficiency and effectiveness, such as letting another person use one's password or computer when no other timely alternative was readily available;

c) the conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was followed by a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation and by notification of supervisor.
COMMANDER’S RESPONSIBILITY

Commanders are required to expeditiously report any adverse (derogatory) information to the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility (DoD CAF).

REPORTING RELEVANCE

The security clearance process relies on three distinct functions, background investigation, adjudication, and continuous evaluation, to ensure trustworthy and reliable individuals are granted a security clearance. Incident reporting is an integral component of the continuous evaluation process.

WHAT INFORMATION IS REPORTED?

Reportable derogatory information is information and behaviors that bring into question an individual’s trustworthiness, judgment, and reliability to protect classified information. The National Adjudicative Guidelines provide a basis in determining what is reportable:

- Submit an incident report in the JPAS and informally suspend access until more information develops.
- Debrief access in JPAS and record locally.
- Allegiance to the United States
- Foreign Influence
- Foreign Preference
- Sexual Behavior
- Personal Conduct
- Financial Considerations
- Alcohol Consumption
- Drug Involvement
- Psychological Conditions
- Criminal Conduct
- Handling Protected Information
- Outside Activities
- Use of Information Technology Systems

HOW DO I REPORT THIS INFORMATION TO THE DoD CAF?

Derogatory information is submitted to the DoD CAF via the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS). Commanders use DA Form 5248-R (DA 5248-R) to document preliminary investigation results, any arrests or confinement, formal reprimand (counseling, UCMJ, corrective training, etc), or actions taken (i.e., attended counseling or anger management, received financial assistance, etc). The form also documents your recommendations to retain security clearance, suspend access to classified information or revoke security clearance.

AM I REQUIRED TO SUBMIT A FOLLOW-UP REPORT?

Commanders are required to submit a follow-up incident report to all initial incident reports every 90-days. A follow-up incident report is not required for final reports.

WHO SUPPORTS ME IN THIS PROCESS?

Seek the advice and assistance of your supporting Security Manager, S-2 or higher headquarter Security Office.

WHAT WILL THE DoD CAF DO WITH THIS INFORMATION?

The DoD CAF will review the reported information for its security significance and will consider the Commander’s recommendation/assessment in determining the appropriate security clearance actions.

WILL AN INCIDENT REPORT AFFECT AN INDIVIDUAL’S CAREER?

In many cases incident reports are resolved favorably and will not affect an individual’s career.

Attending counseling, corrective training, self-reporting, frequency, factors outside of an individual’s control, etc, has a direct bearing on the outcome of an incident report.